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1.  Introduction 
Against a background of falling and low fertility, this paper presents a detailed 
analysis of the fertility behaviour of successive cohorts of women in the UK 
born between 1935 and 1975.
1  It does this by applying the “own child 
method” (Murphy and Berrington, 1993) to repeated cross-sections of data 
drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS).  These data are available on a consistent and continuous basis 
from 1968 – 2004, contain detailed information on household composition, 
allowing us to construct pseudo fertility histories, as well as socio-
demographic information, and yield large enough sample sizes to enable us to 
look at the fertility of single year date-of-birth cohorts.     
Of course, we are not the first to study changing patterns of fertility in the UK.  
Many of the trends that we highlight in this paper (the fall in third-plus births, 
the delay in family formation and the rise in childlessness) have been 
extensively documented and discussed elsewhere (see inter alia Berrington, 
2004, Smallwood, 2002a, Smallwood 2002b, and Smallwood and 
Chamberlain, 2005).   However, looking at the fertility experiences of single 
year of birth cohorts gives a rich picture of trends in fertility and allows us to 
pinpoint exactly when changes in fertility occurred.  On the basis of our 
analysis, we group our forty cohorts into four groups according to their fertility 
experiences. 
•  Group 1: cohorts born 1935-44 – experienced a trend towards earlier 
first births and falling rates of childlessness (the 1941 cohort has the 
highest rate of motherhood in our sample at 89%), but a decline in third 
and higher-order births. 
•  Group 2: cohorts born 1945-54 – experienced a delay in childbearing 
and rising rates of childlessness and one-child families  
                                                 
1 Our approach is similar to that of Goldin (2006) who looks at education, employment and 
fertility of a long time-series of cohorts in the US   3 
•  Group 3: cohorts born 1955-62 – had reasonably stable patterns of 
family size, in spite of a further trend towards later childbearing.   
•  Group 4: cohorts born 1962 onwards – only a few of these cohorts 
have completed their fertility, but the trend towards delayed 
childbearing has accelerated, suggesting a further increase in 
childlessness is likely.  
The data also allow us to look at the relationship between fertility and 
women’s participation in higher education.  Rendall and Smallwood (2003) 
and Berrington (2004) show that, among a single cohort of women born in the 
UK in the 1950s, women with higher educational qualifications typically 
entered motherhood later than those without and were more likely to remain 
childless.  An obvious question to ask is whether the increasing participation 
of women in higher education can explain recent trends in fertility, or whether 
there have been changes in fertility within education groups.  We show that 
the latter is the case and that, over time, there has been a trend towards 
increasing polarisation in fertility, by education.  This is consistent with 
findings for the US (see Rindfuss et al, 1996 and Martin, 2000). 
Analysing changes in fertility on a cohort basis is not uncontroversial; some 
argue strongly that period fertility measures are more appropriate for 
analysing trends (see NiBhrolchain, 1992).  Period fertility measures are 
important since they directly drive population ageing.  Also, many of the 
factors that affect fertility are period-specific (eg government policies, 
availability of contraception, house prices etc), although they will impact on 
different cohorts at different stages in their fertility life-cycles.  But, period 
measures are affected by changes in the timing (tempo) of births across 
cohorts as well as in the number of children women have.  We believe that a 
cohort analysis allows the long-term trends in fertility to emerge more clearly.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses in more detail 
our use of the own child method to construct pseudo fertility histories for the 
women in the FES and FRS samples.  Section 3 presents our analysis of 
fertility by cohort, while section 4 looks at patterns by education.  Section 5 
concludes.      4 
2.  Data and methodology 
The data we use to analyse fertility are drawn from successive waves of the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1968-2003, supplemented with waves of 
the Family Resources Survey (FRS) from 1995-2004.  Both are cross-section, 
household surveys, containing a standard set of demographic and socio-
economic variables on household members, as well as detailed information 
on household spending (the FES) and income (the FRS).  The surveys do not 
specifically collect information on women’s fertility histories.  Instead, we use 
the “own child method” (see Murphy and Berrington, 1993) to infer fertility 
histories from the age of the mother and the age of her natural-born children 
living in the household.   
First, we allocate children in the household to their natural mothers using 
information provided on relationships between household members and the 
benefit unit to which individuals belong.  Then, for each woman we create 
pseudo fertility histories – the age of the mother at birth and the birth order of 
the child – based on the current ages of the mother and children.  So, for 
example, a woman aged 25 who has one child aged 0 is assumed to have 
had her first child at age 25; a woman aged 30 who has one child aged 2 is 
assumed to have had her first child at age 28; a woman aged 35 who has one 
child aged 10 and another aged 8 is assumed to have had her first birth at 
age 25 and her second birth at age 27, and so on.  As these examples 
illustrate, we combine “current” birth probabilities (ie whether or not a woman 
has a birth in the year in which she is observed in the FES/FRS sample) with 
retrospective birth probabilities (ie whether she had a birth in previous years, 
based on the ages of her children).  Finally we use survival analysis to 
construct cohort parity progression ratios from the individual fertility histories.      
Clearly, the own child method is not without its potential problems.  One is 
that we observe the current ages of the mother and any children, but not their 
actual dates of birth.  In practice, a woman aged 25 who has one child aged 0 
may actually have given birth when she was 24.  Since the woman could not 
be a year older than we currently observe her to be when she gave birth, our 
estimates of the proportion of women who have births of order b by a 
particular age, and the average age at birth order b, will tend to have a   5 
systematic downward bias.  However, the bias should apply equally to all 
cohorts and education groups, and should not therefore affect the validity of 
the inferences we draw about differences in fertility behaviour over time and 
by education.   
A second problem is that the own child method relies on information on 
surviving children in the household to infer fertility histories – infant mortality 
and household reconstitution will result in measurement error.  However, low 
rates of child mortality
2 and the fact that the overwhelming majority of children 
stay with their natural mother in the event of family breakup act to reduce the 
effect of these factors in practice.   
Another potential problem – one that is more serious in practice – is that older 
women may have had children who have now left home.  If we observe a 
woman aged 39 with no children, we cannot say for certain whether she has 
not yet had children, or she had one child when she was 17 who left home 
when they were 20.
3  In the latter case, the own child method would fail to 
capture births to women who had children relatively young – we would tend to 
over-estimate the mean and median ages associated with different birth 
orders (ie the average ages of the mother at first, second and subsequent 
births) and to under-estimate family size for people who entered childbearing 
at a relatively young age.   
A solution to this problem is to adopt a maximum age threshold, i.e. to 
exclude from our analysis women above a threshold age at which the problem 
of children leaving home starts to significantly affect the estimates of the 
proportion of women having births at younger ages.  Assuming that women 
start having children from age 16, the selection problems may arise from as 
young as age 32.  In fact, sensitivity analysis of estimates of the proportion of 
                                                 
2 The rate of death of children less than one year was 27 per 1,000 live births in 1951-55, 
falling to 6 per 1,000 live births in 1996-00.  Our estimates will therefore tend to underestimate 
births more at the beginning of the period.   
3 The problem is made potentially worse in practice by the fact that students who live away 
from home are not counted as part of the household in the FES/FRS.   6 
women having a first birth by age 20, shows that the threshold can be raised 
to 37 before there are significant effects.
4  The results of this sensitivity 
analysis are included in the Appendix.     
Our analysis of fertility therefore excludes births after age 38 and will 
systematically under-estimate the proportion of each cohort having first and 
subsequent births.  Murphy and Grundy (2003) suggest that, among the 1920 
cohort, 2.5% of births were to women aged 40-plus, but fewer than 1% of 
births among cohorts born after 1930.  However, the recent trend towards 
later child-bearing, suggests that the effect of this bias is likely to increase 
among later cohorts.  This must be borne in mind when interpreting our 
results.   
The advantages of generating cohort fertility profiles by applying the own child 
method to repeated cross-section data from the FES and FRS are that we 
have large sample sizes (see Figure 1), enabling us to look at single year of 
birth cohorts.  We have full information on birth order, which is not complete in 
data derived from official birth registration data, and we have information on 
the mother’s education.   
                                                 
4 This suggests that there may be a negative relation between the age of the mother at birth 
and the age at which they child leaves home.   7 
Figure 1 
Cohort sample sizes, pooled FES/FRS sample 
 
 
As a final check of the validity of our approach, we compare an estimate of 
the period total fertility rate (TFR) derived from the FES/FRS data from 1968,
5 
with the official measure of the TFR derived from registration data, shown 
over a longer period to highlight fertility trends.  The TFR measures the 
number of children a woman would have if she experienced the age-specific 
fertility rate in that year – it is therefore influenced by changes in timing of 
births between cohorts, as well as by changes in the number of births.  In fact, 
as shown in Figure 2 below, the TFR estimated using the FES/FRS is very 
close to the official measure.  As is to be expected, our estimate is lower than 
the official measure since we exclude births over 37.  But, we pick up the 
major trends in fertility (in particular, the decline in the total fertility rate from 
around 2.5 in 1968 to 1.7 by the end of the period), and the average 
difference is relatively stable over time.   
                                                 
5 With retrospective estimates, we impute fertility behaviour in our FES/FRS sample prior to 
1968, but not for the full age range 15-37.     8 
Figure 2 
Total fertility rate – FES/FRS estimate and ONS estimate 
 
 
3.  Cohort fertility patterns 
Figures 3 – 7 present summary information on the fertility of different single 
year date of birth cohorts.  The oldest cohort in our sample was born in 1935, 
while the youngest cohort who have completed their fertility (ie reached 38) 
were born in 1965; we also show information on the proportion who have 
experienced a first and second birth by age 30 for the cohort born in 1975 and 
by age 25 for the cohort born in 1980. 
Figure 3 shows average completed family size for cohorts born between 1935 
and 1965.  Estimated average family size fell by around 0.5 of a child, from 
2.25 among the 1935 cohort to less than 1.75 among the 1965 cohort.
6  Of 
                                                 
6 It must be remembered that we are only looking at fertility up to age 37 and we will therefore 
under-estimate average family size.  Smallwood and Jeffries (2003) estimate completed 
family size for the 1945 cohort to be 2.19 (2.42 for women with children); for the 1960 cohort, 
their figures are 1.87 and 2.33 respectively.  These figures suggest that we under-estimate 
the fall in average family size for all women, but over-estimate the fall for women with 
children.     9 
course, taking the 1935 cohort as a starting point is somewhat arbitrary, 
determined by our data.  Murphy and Grundy (2003) show that fertility among 
the 1935 cohort was high compared to previous cohorts, consistent with the 
relatively low annual fertility rates over the period 1935 – 55 (with the 
exception of the post- second world war mini boom) shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 
















































































































The decline in average family size was driven by two trends – a decline in 
average family size among women who had children and an increase in 
childlessness.  As shown in Figure 3, we estimate that most of the fall is due 
to the former – among women with children, average family size declined from 
around 2.4 children among the 1935 cohort to fewer than 2 children among 
the 1965 cohort. 
Changes in family size are examined further in figure 4, which shows the 
proportion of each cohort achieving different completed family sizes.  This 
highlights very different patterns in changing fertility across the cohorts.  The 
first phase of falling family size, affecting cohorts born between 1935 and 
1947, was driven by a fall in third and higher order births.  The proportion of a 
cohort having three or more children fell from nearly 40 per cent among the   10 
1937 cohort to 22 per cent among the 1948 cohort, while the proportion 
having two children rose between the 1935 and 1945 cohorts from 35 per cent 
to nearly 50 per cent. 
Figure 4 













































































































During this first phase of falling fertility, the age of childbearing actually fell.  
The proportion of women having a first birth by age 25 increased to 50 per 
cent among the 1942 cohort, while nearly 80 per cent of this cohort had their 
first birth by the age of 30 (see Figures 5 and 6).  The proportion of a cohort 
remaining childless also fell, with nearly 90 per cent of the 1941 cohort having 
at least one child – the highest proportion of all the cohorts in our sample.   
Across the cohorts born 1935 – 45, women started childbearing earlier, but 
were then more likely than their older counterparts to stop at two.  
Interestingly, information on use of the pill, summarized in Table 1, shows 
that, when it was introduced, the pill was used most widely by married women 
to control third and subsequent births.  Only by the early 1970s, when the pill 
became freely available from clinics, and ultimately, GPs, was it used to 
control first births.  Of course, this does not imply that the pill was a causal 
factor in restricting family size, but suggests that it may have acted as a   11 
mechanism for reducing third and higher-order births among the 1935-45 
cohorts. 
Table 1 
Percentage of women using the pill, ever-married women under 41 
  1961 – 65  1966 – 70  1971 – 75 
First interval  10%  36%  64% 
Second interval  12%  33%  44% 
Third interval  18%  38%  48% 
Fourth interval   21%  39%  38% 
Note: First interval refers to the period before the first birth; second interval to 
the period between first and second births and so on. 
Source: Bone (1978) 
Figure 5 
Age at first birth, by cohort 
   12 
Figure 6 









































































































The second phase of declining fertility, which affected cohorts born 1945 – 
1955 was one in which childbearing was delayed and rates of childlessness 
increased.  The proportion of a cohort with no children rose by nearly nine 
percentage points from just over one in ten among the 1945 cohort to nearly 
one in five among the 1955 cohort.
7  The proportion with only one child also 
increased.   
The cohorts born between 1955 and 1965 reflect a third phase of changing 
fertility, during which time the age of childbearing continued to rise, albeit at a 
reduced rate, but there appears to have been little further change in average 
family size and the patterns of completed family sizes remained relatively 
stable.  As shown in figure 5, an acceleration of first births taking place after 
age 30 has largely offset the continued fall in first births occurring at younger 
ages. 
                                                 
7 Berrington (2004) presents very similar figures and estimates rates of childlessness to be 
one in ten among the cohort born in 1945 and one in five among the cohort born in 1960.   13 
Cohorts born after 1965 have yet to complete their fertility.  The proportion 
having a first birth before age 30 has continued to fall, and at an increased 
rate; among the cohort born in 1975 fewer than half had a first birth by age 30, 
compared to 80 per cent among the cohort born in 1942.  Figure 5 shows that 
the main driver was a fall in births among women aged 25 – 29; the proportion 
of women giving birth before age 25 appears to have been relatively more 
stable.  Further increases in births to women aged 30-plus may be enough to 
offset the decline in childbearing at younger ages, leaving rates of 
childlessness unchanged, but ultimately, delayed childbearing may begin 
increasingly to impact on the number of children women have.    
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full explanation for why different 
cohorts experienced different trends in their fertility, but there are some 
interesting insights into the experiences of the different cohorts from looking at 
rates of employment.  These are shown for women aged 25 – 34 in Figures 7 
and 8, separately for all women and for women with children.   
There has been almost no change in the overall rate of part-time employment 
among women aged 25-29, although among women in this age range with 
children, there does appear to have been a slight increase among younger 
cohorts – suggesting that fewer women in this age range have children, but of 
those that do, more of them work part-time.  There is evidence of an increase 
in part-time employment among women aged 30-34, mainly among those with 
children and particularly affecting cohorts born 1935 – 1945.  These were the 
cohorts who began childbearing early but were more likely than their older 
cohorts to stop at two children – the evidence on their employment, suggests 
that these cohorts had family first and part-time work later.     
There has been a steady increase in full-time employment among women 
aged 25-29, beginning with the 1945 cohort, and among women aged 30-34 
beginning with the 1950 cohort.  Among women with children, however, there 
was no real increase in full-time employment until the 1955 cohort.  The 1945 
– 1955 cohorts experienced a delay in childbearing and a rise in 
childlessness.  The evidence on their employment suggests that some may 
have put their career first, putting off children, possibly forever.  Among 
women born 1960 onwards, there are increasing signs of women combining   14 
career with children – there is a continued rise in the proportion who work full-
time, but also an increase in the proportion with children who work full-time.  
The fact that more women appear to be combining work with children may 
explain why patterns of childbearing among these cohorts are relatively more 
stable than among the earlier cohorts.      
Figure 7 
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Figure 8 




















































































4. Fertility and education 
Previous studies have established a strong link between fertility and 
education.  A priori, the effect of higher education on fertility is ambiguous.  In 
the first instance, the particular difficulties of combining full-time education and 
child-bearing because of the absence of any formal maternity provision for 
students is likely to result in a delay in family formation.  Higher levels of 
education are also typically associated with higher wages and so may raise 
the opportunity cost of taking time out of the labour market for own childcare.  
Potentially offsetting this, however, employers may have incentives to retain 
qualified women, making it easier for educated women to combine paid work 
with having children.
8   
                                                 
8 Women with higher levels of education typically suffer lower penalties associated with 
having children Rake (2000).  Of course, these figures may not be directly comparable   16 
By raising permanent income, higher levels of education among women may 
actually increase the desired quantity of children, an effect that is likely to be 
amplified via assortative mating.  However, Becker (1960) argued that higher 
levels of income may increase the desired quality rather than quantity of 
children, with families choosing to have smaller families and devoting more 
resources to each child.  A further effect of education may operate through the 
shape of the expected permanent income profile over the lifetime.  Happel et 
al (1984) argued that, in the presence of imperfect capital markets, the desire 
for smoother consumption may result in a delay in child-bearing if incomes are 
expected to increase, as is typically much more the case for those with higher 
levels of education.       
In practice, higher education has been almost universally found to be 
associated with lower fertility.  For the UK, Rendall and Smallwood (2003) and 
Berrington (2004) show for a cohort of women born in the UK between 1954-
58, that in common with other countries, higher levels of education in the UK 
are associated with a delay in childbirth and higher levels of childlessness.  
Conditional on having a first birth, women with higher levels of education were 
likely to have a second child more quickly,
9 but this was not enough to offset 
the first effect, resulting in lower average completed family sizes.  In the light 
of the growing numbers of women who take some form of further education, 
an obvious question to ask is whether this change in education participation 
can account for the changing patterns of fertility   
The FES and FRS collect consistent information on the age someone left full-
time education and we use this to construct different education variables, 
shown in Figure 9 below.  We define a variable “college-educated” if someone 
says they left full-time education at age 21 or above.  Within the group of 
those with no college education, we also separate out those who leave school 
at 16 or before.  Figure 9 clearly illustrates the rise in female participation in 
                                                                                                                                            
because they reflect choices about family size and childcare arrangements, which may differ 
quite a lot between women with different levels of education. 
9 Wright et al show that mother’s education has no effect on the (conditional) third birth rate.   17 
further education – there has been an increase in the proportion of each 
cohort who are college-educated, particularly among cohorts born after 1965, 
and a rise in the proportion who receive some further education (ie those who 
stay on beyond 16, but are not classified as college-educated), particularly 
among cohorts born 1945 – 1955.  Unfortunately, the education information is 
first asked in 1978, restricting the available cohorts with completed fertility to 
those born between 1945 and 1965.  We are therefore looking at the period of 
delayed childbearing and rising childlessness, rather than the decline in third-
plus births. 
Figure 9 


































































































Figure 10 summarizes completed family size, by cohort for women with 
different levels of education.  It clearly illustrates the systematic relationship 
between education and fertility that is present among all cohorts – the higher 
a woman’s level of education, the lower her fertility.  But, what is also clear is 
that changes in fertility across cohorts have affected all education groups, 
albeit to different degrees.  If we fix fertility rates by education to be those of 
the first observed cohort (1945), then changing participation in education   18 
across cohorts can explain only one half of the overall fall in fertility.
10  The 
other half of the decline is attributable to changes in patterns of fertility within 
education groups.   
Figure 10 








































































































































Since the cohort born in 1945, there has been a widening gap between the 
fertility experiences of college-educated women and women leaving school at 
16.  In 1945, the completed family size of women with college education was 
0.4 children less than that of women who left school at 16.  By the 1965 
cohort, this gap had grown to nearly 0.6 – driven by greater increases in 
childlessness and a bigger decline in three-plus child families among college-
educated women (see Figure 11).   
                                                 
10 Of course, there may also have been changes in the type of educational qualifications 
achieved within our broad groups.   19 
The completed family size of women leaving school at 16 changed little 
between the cohort born in 1945 and the cohort born in 1965, while the 
completed family size of college-educated women fell by around 0.2 children.  
College-educated women born in the early 1950s appear to have had 
particularly low levels of fertility, linked to relatively high levels of 
childlessness.     
As well as an increasing polarisation in the quantity of births, there has been a 
widening gap in the timing of first births (see Figure 12).  Among the 1945 
cohort, 60 per cent of college-educated women had a first birth by age 30, 
compared to 80 per cent of women who had left school at 16.  By the 1975 
cohort, around 70 per cent of women leaving school at 16 still experienced a 
first birth before 30, compared to only 20 per cent of college-educated 
women.  These women are now much more likely to have their first birth after 
age 30 than before.     
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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These patterns of fertility are reflected in an increasing polarisation of 
employment between college-educated women and women who left school at 
16.  Among cohorts born before 1950, the rate of full-time employment among 
college-educated women was around 10 percentage points higher than that 
among women who left school at 16.  But among later cohorts, the rate of 
growth of employment among college-educated women has been more rapid.  
This growth in employment among college-educated women appears to have 
taken place in two phases.  During the first phase, most of the increase 
appears to have been among women without children – this coincides with the 
rise in childlessness among women born in the early 1950s.  But among 
cohorts born after 1955, there has been a substantial increase in the 
proportion of college-educated women with children who are working full-time.  
Rates of full-time employment among women with children are very similar by 
education across cohorts born before 1955, but across later cohorts there is 
an increasing divergence in full-time employment among mothers by   21 
education.  For whatever reason – affordability of childcare, more flexible 
employers or preferences – a far higher proportion of college-educated 
women who have children are able to combine full-time work and 
motherhood.   
Figure 13 
























































































   22 
Figure 15 























































































5.   Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed fertility across forty date-of-birth cohorts born 
between 1935 and 1975. 
Among cohorts who have completed their fertility (born 1935 to 1965), 
average completed family size fell by around 0.5 child.  Most of the fall can be 
attributed to a decline in third-plus births affecting the cohorts born 1935 to 
1945.  This coincides with initial take-up of the pill at higher birth intervals, 
suggesting that many of these women, although they typically began 
childbearing earlier than older cohorts, for whatever reason, made a 
deliberate choice to limit their family size to two children.   
Among cohorts born since 1945 there has been a delay in childbearing and 
increasing rates of childlessness – from around one in ten women born in the 
early 1940s to one in five women born after 1955.  Around half of this change 
can be attributed to a rise in female participation in higher education.  But,   23 
there have also been changes in fertility within education groups and an 
increasing polarisation in fertility and employment between college-educated 
women and women who leave school at 16.   
Among women born in 1945, the employment and fertility experiences of 
women with college education and women who left school at 16 were fairly 
similar – the majority of both groups had their first child before age 30 (80 per 
cent of those who left school at 16 and 60 per cent of those with a college 
education) and the majority were not in full-time work.  Among the cohort born 
thirty years later, the experiences of the two groups were quite different; only 
a minority of those with a college education (20 per cent) had their first child 
before 30, compared to 70 per cent of those who left school at 16; nearly 70 
per cent were in full-time employment, compared to only 40 per cent of those 
who left school at 16.   
Since the 1965 cohort, there has been a rapid increase in the proportion of 
women with college education.  This is likely to cause a further fall in average 
completed family sizes.  If we fix fertility rates by education group to the level 
of the 1965 cohort, then the changes in female participation in further 
education would lead to a 0.07 reduction in average completed family size.  
But, as shown in this paper, predicting the fertility effects of changing patterns 
of education is complicated by subsequent career and occupation choices.  
Ultimately, these appear to be equally, if not more, important for determining 
fertility than education choices alone.   
What are some of the implications of the changing patterns of fertility? 
One set of issues concerns the consequences of the polarisation of the age of 
childbearing for the mothers and the children.  Much of the evidence suggests 
that it is likely to lead to an amplification of the material advantages of better-
educated mothers – both for themselves and for their children.  Rake (2000) 
shows that the fertility penalty associated with childbirth typically falls with the 
age of childbirth, while Iacovou (2001) and Hawkes et al (2004) show that, 
controlling for a range of background variables, children with older parents are 
advantaged.   24 
Finally, an obvious question to ask is the extent to which the second phase of 
falling fertility, reflecting rising childlessness is “involuntary”.  As evidence on 
this, Figures 16 shows information on expectations and realisations of fertility, 
by age, for women with and without further education, revealing a far greater 
disparity between early expectations and subsequent realisations for 
educated women than for women with no further education.  Of course, these 
figures should be interpreted with caution – they are derived from cross-
section data, so expectations and realisations are not from the same women 
and the age profiles may combine age and cohort effects.  Nevertheless, they 
show that, among young women, fertility expectations vary little by education 
– and, unless the fertility experiences of these young women are very different 
to those of their older counterparts, the two groups are likely to have very 
different experiences of fertility in practice. 
Figure 16 
Expectations and realisations of fertility, by age and education 
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Note: This information is taken from the General Household Survey – women 
are asked how many children they expect to have, including the ones they 
already have. 
What is interesting is that these differences in expectations and realisations 
are in spite of the fact that more college-educated women combine full-time 
work and motherhood than women who leave school at 16.  The ability to 
combine work and children is clearly linked to fertility – those college-
educated women who were born in the early 1950s, many of whom appear to 
have made a choice, experienced even lower fertility than later cohorts.  The 
rise in full-time employment among educated women with children suggests 
that fewer of them today appear to need to make a choice, but if they are, 
they are less likely than school-leavers to choose children.       26 
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Appendix: Impact of the age threshold on the probability of giving birth 
Each row gives the estimated coefficient on age at interview from running a 
(pooled) regression of the probability of giving birth at (different) younger 
ages.  We also report the number of individual cohorts that “fail” at each age 
threshold – defined as the coefficient being significant in a separate 
regression for that cohort.  These regression results are used as the basis for 
excluding information on women aged 38 and over. 




P(16)  # cohorts 
fail 
P(17)  # cohorts 
fail 
P(18)  # cohorts 
fail 
P(19)  # cohorts 
fail 
P(20)  # cohorts 
fail 
33  -0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0  -0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0  -0.0005 
(0.0012) 
0  -0.0092 
(0.0015) 
0  -0.0081 
(0.0018) 
0 
34  -0.0008 
(0.0004) 
0  -0.0012 
(0.0008) 
0  -0.0010 
(0.0011) 
 
0  -0.0091 
(0.0014) 
0  -0.0014 
(0.0017) 
0 
35  -0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
0  -0.0019** 
(0.0008) 
0  -0.0023** 
(0.0011) 
0  -0.0022 
(0.0014) 
0  -0.0022 
(0.0017) 
0 
36  -0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
0  -0.0031*** 
(0.0007) 
0  -0.0039*** 
(0.0011) 
0  -0.0036*** 
(0.0014) 




37  -0.0018*** 
(0.0004) 
1  -0.0041*** 
(0.0008) 
3  -0.0058*** 
(0.0011) 
 
0  -0.0056*** 
0.0014 
0  -0.0047*** 
(0.0016) 
0 
38  -0.0020*** 
(0.0004) 
2  -0.0051*** 
(0.0007) 
5  -0.0075*** 
(0.0011) 
1  -0.0079*** 
(0.0013) 
 
0  -0.0070*** 
(0.0016) 
0 
39  -0.0023*** 
(0.0004) 
3  -0.0061*** 
(0.0007) 
6  -0.0095*** 
(0.0010) 
7  -0.0104*** 
(0.0013) 
3  -0.0100*** 
(0.0016) 
2 
40  -0.0026*** 
(0.0004) 
5  -0.0070*** 
(0.0060) 
8  -0.0113*** 
(0.0010) 
11  -0.0129*** 
(0.0013) 
7  -0.0132*** 
(0.0015) 
4 
Notes: standard errors in brackets, (***) (**) (*) denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively.   